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Abstract 
Background. The revision of Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) in the DSM-5 (DSM-5, 2013) 
proposes a cluster-free model of ASD symptoms in both adults and youth. Published evaluations of 
competing models of ASD clustering in youth have rarely been examined. Methods We used 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (combined with multi-group invariance tests) to explore the latent 
structure of ASD symptoms in a trauma-exposed sample of children and young people (N=594). The 
DSM-5 structure was compared with the previous DSM-IV conceptualisation (4-factor), and two 
alternative models proposed in the literature (3-factor; 5-factor). Model fit was examined using 
goodness-of fit-indices. We also established DSM-5 ASD prevalence rates relative to DSM-IV ASD, 
and the ability of these models to classify children impaired by their symptoms. Results. Based on 
both the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), the inter-factor correlations and invariance testing, the 
3-factor model best accounted for the profile of ASD symptoms. DSM-5 ASD led to slightly higher 
prevalence rates than DSM-IV ASD and performed similarly to DSM-IV with respect to categorising 
children impaired by their symptoms. Modifying the DSM-5 ASD algorithm to a 3+ or 4+ symptom 
requirement was the strongest predictor of impairment. Conclusions. These findings suggest that a 
uni-factorial general distress model is not the optimal model of capturing the latent structure of ASD 
symptom profiles in youth and that modifying the current DSM-5 9+ symptom algorithm could 
potentially lead to a more developmentally sensitive conceptualisation. 
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Introduction 
 While it is common for children to display stress responses in the first few weeks following a 
trauma, only a minority will go on to develop Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Bryant et al., 
2004; Dalgleish et al., 2008; Kassam-Adams & Winston, 2004; Meiser-Stedman et al., 2008).  This 
has prompted debate about the clinical utility of classifying these early post-trauma responses using 
an Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) diagnosis (Bryant, 2011). First introduced in the DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994) to identify individuals likely to develop subsequent PTSD (only 
diagnosable 1-month post-trauma), symptoms of ASD were arranged into re-experiencing , 
avoidance, and arousal clusters, mirroring the structure of DSM-IV PTSD closely. DSM-IV ASD also 
included a dissociation cluster, based on research indicating that dissociation was a prognostic 
indicator of later pathology (Bryant et al., 2011). This DSM-IV conceptualisation operationalises the 
idea that the distinctive symptom clusters of later PTSD actually develop within the first two weeks of 
a trauma, and, in addition, that dissociation is a distinctive feature of those that will later develop 
chronic PTSD. However, this ASD model has poor predictive validity, and the overly restrictive nature 
of the dissociation criterion means that adults and children can miss out on an ASD diagnosis despite 
having clinically significant problems in other symptom domains (Harvey & Bryant, 1998; Meiser-
Stedman, Yule, Smith, Glucksman, & Dalgleish, 2005). Six confirmatory factor analytic tests (Armour, 
Shevlin, & Elkit, 2011; Brooks et al., 2008; Hansen, Armour, & Elklit, 2012; Hansen, Lasgaard, & 
Elklit, 2013; Wang, Li, Shi, Zhang, & Shen, 2010) carried out in adults  have evaluated the DSM-IV 
structure (see Table 1) of ASD compared to alternative conceptualisations derived from the PTSD 
literature (with the addition of a dissociation criterion), showing  it is the best fitting model in only two 
of these six studies (Brooks et al., 2008; Hansen et al., 2013) (Refer to Supplementary Table S1 for a 
summary of study fundings). 
 Based on these sets of findings, there was a radical overhaul of ASD in the DSM-5 (APA, 
2013). Along with minor symptom changes and the revision of Criterion A describing the traumatic 
event, the DSM-IV requirement of at least one symptom from a set of distinct symptom clusters was 
removed (although 5 distinct clusters were retained as an organising principal for the different 
symptoms). This  addressed the potentially unhelpful requirement for dissociation to be mandatory for 
a positive diagnosis. Instead, for a diagnosis of ASD, the DSM-5 specifies experiencing nine 
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symptoms from a single list of 14 (down from the DSM-IV list of 17 symptoms) to be present. The 
DSM-5 ASD thus posits a unifactorial ‘general distress model’. The rationale behind this change was 
that no compelling support for any given model of the ASD symptom structure had clearly emerged 
from factor analytic investigations and consequently the structure of early traumatic stress responses 
was considered to be too variable for distinct and reliable clustering patterns to occur (Bryant et al., 
2011). The advantage of a ‘general distress’ model, it was proposed, is the potential to better identify 
individuals at risk of developing a range of psychological disorders in the future, not just PTSD (Bryant 
et al., 2011). 
The removal of diagnostic clustering in ASD was a bold move. There are significant merits to 
elucidating a valid and reliable ASD clustering system. First, there are concerns that ASD does not 
represent a distinct disorder from PTSD (Brewin, Andrews, & Rose, 2003). Examining the validity of 
putative ASD symptom clusters, in particular the unique dissociation symptoms, is critical to the case 
for ASD as a distinct disorder. This argument extends beyond ASD and PTSD. Many of the symptoms 
of both disorders overlap with other mood and anxiety syndromes calling some to question the validity 
of stress disorders as a separable diagnostic entity (Brady, Killeen, Brewerton, & Lucerini, 2000). 
Evaluating the validity of symptom clusters unique to the stress disorders (notably the re-experiencing 
symptoms) is critical in establishing the validity of this class of disorder. Secondly, elucidating 
potential symptom clusters can improve our understanding of the aetiology and maintenance of ASD 
and of later PTSD, by identifying risk factors for specific clusters/factors of symptoms, and revealing 
relationships between ASD factors and ongoing impairment, including later PTSD. Third, there may 
be underlying cognitive or biological mechanisms mechanisms that only relate to a particular group of 
symptoms and clustering allows these to be better identified (Frances & Widiger, 2012). Such 
relationships might not be detectable if clustering were removed, making it difficult to refine the 
specific pathways necessary for the development of treatment models that target these underlying 
processes. Fourth, clusters make it easier for new theoretical approaches such as the Research 
Domains Criteria (RDoC; Insel et al., 2010) and other trans-diagnostic approaches to evaluate 
whether the psychological constructs/outcomes (e.g., intrusive memories) they aim to evaluate are 
consistent or different across disparate disorders. Finally, a cluster-free diagnostic algorithm has 
potential implications for the prevalence rates of the disorder, relative to a cluster-based algorithm 
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(Magruder & Calderone, 2000; Mullins-Sweatt, Lengel, & DeShong, 2016), with important implications 
for the provision of clinical care. It may be that particular clusters have a stronger relationship to 
clinical impairment and a cluster-free approach impedes greater understanding of such potential 
relationships. 
The body of empirical, modelling and theoretical work around the diagnosis of ASD has to 
date focused almost entirely on the conceptualisation of ASD in adults with little corresponding 
analysis of the diagnosis in youth. Reflecting this, the DSM-5 draws no distinctions across the age 
range in terms of ASD. However, there are several putative issues concerning the application of the 
DSM-5 ASD model to youth. Firstly, the model contains no developmental adaptations in contrast to 
the DSM-5 conceptualisation of PTSD and to a growing body of work suggesting that stress disorders 
present differently in adults relative to not just young children but also older children and adolescents 
(Meiser-Stedman et al., 2008). In support of this, research indicates the tendency to express 
individual PTSD symptoms is impacted by age (Chen, Lin, Tseng, & Wu, 2002).  Secondly, question 
marks have been raised about whether the >9 symptom requirement would have greater clinical utility 
by reducing the requirment to 3-4 symptoms (Kassam-Adams et al., 2012). Thirdly, unlike in adults, 
there has been almost no examination of the factor structure of ASD symptoms in youth with the 
exception of a study of older Filipino adolescents exposed to a flash flood, which supported the  5-
factor dysphoria model (Mordeno & Cue, 2015). Taken togethor, the case against a clustered 
approach is less clear for traumatised youth and a proper evaluation of symptom clustering 
immediately post-trauma in younger populations is required. 
Given this, the present study had four inter-related aims. The first was to carry out a CFA of 
ASD symptoms in youth comparing the unifactorial, cluster-free DSM-5 approach with other models 
derived from the adult field (Table 1). To do this, we carried out a CFA of the 17 DSM-IV ASD 
symptoms (these include the 14 DSM-5 symptoms but allow us to also test the DSM-IV model) in 
youth aged 6-17 years, who had experienced a discrete one-off trauma, using pooled data from 4 
sites. Data-pooling is advantageous over single site CFA’s and standard review approaches based on 
mean data (e.g., meta-analysis, systematic reviews) as robust statistical techniques can be used to 
assess the potential influence of moderators (i.e., recruitment site, trauma type) of factor structure. 
Secondly, we compared ASD prevalence rates in our sample for the current DSM-5 diagnosis relative 
6 
 
to the previous DSM-IV diagnosis. In youth, between 5% and 25% of children and young people 
suffer from ASD according to DSM-IV (Bryant et al., 2004; Dalgleish et al., 2008; Kassam-Adams & 
Winston, 2004; Meiser-Stedman et al., 2008). Preliminary examinations of the DSM-5 algorithm in 
youth suggests that the new DSM-5 model would lead to substantially lower prevalence in children 
(Kassam-Adams et al., 2012), but this finding must be replicated. Thirdly, we investigated whether the 
unifactorial ‘general distress’ model was a better predictor of clinical impairment relative to the DSM-
IV model. Finally, following from the work of Kassam-Adams et al. (2012), we investigated whether 
the DSM-5 requirement of 9+ symptoms was the best predictor of impairment relative to lower 
symptom thresholds. 
Method 
Sample: Data for 594 children and young people who had been exposed to a Criterion A discrete 
stressor within the previous 4 weeks (Mean age=12.55 years, SD=2.99, Range=6-17 years) were 
pooled from centres in East Anglia (EA) (n=189, 8-16 years), Oxford (n=65, 6-17 years), London 
(Sample 1: n=59, 7-10 yrs; Sample 2: n=92, 10-16 years) and Philadelphia (n=189, 6-17 years). 
Children were recruited from either an inpatient setting or emergency department. Each study 
received ethics approval from the local recruitment site. Informed consent was obtained from adult 
carers/parents and assent from young people.  
With the exception of EA, details of recruitment flow are published elsewhere (Bryant et al., 2004; 
Dalgleish et al., 2008; Kassam-Adams & Winston, 2004; Meiser-Stedman et al., 2008). In EA the 
inclusion criteria were in line with the other centres as follows: any event that involved the threat of 
death, severe injury, or threat to bodily integrity, or witnessing such an event (typically road traffic 
collisions [RTCs] and assaults). The exclusion criteria were: intellectual disability; assaults by the 
young person’s caregiver or close relative; being unconscious for >15 minutes; not being fluent in 
English; ongoing exposure to threat; history of organic brain damage; and significant risk of self-harm. 
A member of the clinical care team at the hospital identified cases from medical records and invited 
families to participate by letter (opt-out consent). 
The characteristics of the final sample are presented in Table 2. The Oxford and Philadelphia 
samples recruited children and young people involved in RTC’s. The EA sample included victims of 
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assaults1, RTC’s and accidental injuries and the London sample comprised assault and RTC victims. 
The majority of the final sample had experienced RTC’s (n=441), followed by assaults (n=87) and 
then accidental injuries (n=66). The proportions of children endorsing at least one symptom from 
individual clusters ranged from 52% for the avoidance cluster to 76% for the dissociation cluster.  
Measures: In line with previous approaches (Meiser-Stedman et al., 2008), we pooled data across 
different DSM-IV ASD instruments. DSM-IV ASD symptoms were indexed using well-validated 
measures administered 2-4 weeks post-trauma2. Measures (described for each site below) were 
obtained via home interviews except at the EA site where measures were obtained over the phone.  
Philadelphia. The Children’s Acute Stress Questionnaire (CASQ; Kassam-Adams, 2006) is a 25-
item self-report instrument with good internal consistency (α=.86), test-retest reliability (r=.76 for the 
total subscale and r=.59-.68 for individual subscales), and convergent validity (r=.77 with the Child 
and Adolescent Trauma Symptom Scale; March, 1999).  
All UK sites used structured clinical interviews to assess symptoms. As there are no validated 
interviews of ASD in children and young people, researchers added developmentally appropriate 
dissociation items derived from the adult ASD literature to existing PTSD interviews, in line with 
previous studies (Bryant et al., 2004; Dalgleish et al., 2008; Kassam-Adams & Winston, 2004; Meiser-
Stedman et al., 2008). 
EA. The Children’s Posttraumatic Stress Disorders Inventory (CPTSD-I; Saigh et al., 2000) is a 
structured interview for assessing PTSD in children and adolescents that has excellent internal 
consistency, test-retest reliability, and inter-rater reliability (Saigh et al., 2000; Yasik et al., 2001). 
                                                          
3 The traumas that precipitated the development of ASD needed to be one-off in nature, for example 
one-off assaults as opposed to repeated domestic violence or physical abuse. This was either 
determined via the initial screening carried out with parents in the hospital or via the examination of 
medical records. 
2 Data collected across all four sites captured the full range of DSM-IV and DSM-5 ASD symptoms. 
Changes to ASD in DSM-5 are as follows: DSM-IV B1 ‘emotional numbing’ has been refined to describe 
absence of positive emotional experiences only in DSM-5 (B5); DSM-IV B2 ‘loss of awareness’, B3 
‘depersonalization’ and B4 ‘derealization’ are grouped under DSM-5 B6 ‘altered sense of reality’, and; 
DSM-IV symptoms c) psychological distress to reminders and e) physiological reactivity are grouped 
under DSM-5 B4. 
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London. Sample 1 (n=92 cases) completed The Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule - Child 
Version (ADIS-C; Silverman & Albano, 1996). The ADIS-C contains 27 items measuring symptoms of 
PTSD in addition to a single item assessing impairment. Sample 2 (n=59) completed the Clinician 
Administered PTSD Scale—Child and Adolescent Version (CAPS-CA; Nader, 2002), which indexes 
both the frequency and intensity of PTSD symptoms.  
Oxford. A combination of structured clinical interview and self-report measures determined ASD 
diagnosis. The widely established Children’s Impact of Event Scale (IES-8; Dyregrov & Yule, 1995), 
an 8-item self-report measure of intrusion and avoidance symptoms, was used to assess symptoms 
on a 4-point scale (Not at all=0; Rarely=1; Sometimes=3; Often=5). The Child Post-Traumatic Stress 
Research Index (CPTSD-RI; Pynoos et al., 1987), a systematic clinical assessment of PTSD with 
widely established psychometric properties, was administered to cover items not contained in the IES-
8 (i.e., arousal items).  
Impairment ratings. Positive categorical impairment ratings were calculated according to whether 
the young person endorsed problems in at least one ASD Criterion F area of functioning (e.g., school, 
family, and social) on each of the instruments described above.  
Data analysis:   
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Four CFA models were specified (Table 1). Due to the dichotomous nature of the items, 
tetrachoric inter-item correlations were estimated, and covariate adjustment then made within EQS 
v6.1 software (Bentler, 2006). A preliminary factor analysis using direct oblimin rotation was carried 
out to obtain an estimate of the size of the factor loadings for marker variables in need of scaling in 
the subsequent analysis (Loehlin, 1992). Mardia’s multivariate kurtosis coefficient as recommended 
by, for example, Raykov and Marcoulides (2006) and its normalised estimate were used to assess 
whether the multivariate distribution of all the observed variables deviated from normality. This 
statistic, and the univariate item skew of >1.5, suggested non-normality in the items. Robust 
maximum likelihood estimation was therefore used to fit the factor models in this sample of 
intermediate size (Lee, Poon & Bentler, 1995). These estimates also perform better than uncorrected 
statistics where the normal distribution assumption is false and better than a distribution-free method 
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in all but the largest samples (Chou, Bentler, & Satorra, 1991; Hu, Bentler, & Kano, 1992). The 
tetrachoric correlation is recommended as a measure of association between pairs of categorical 
variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The Satorra-Bentler scaled 2 goodness of fit test (Satorra & 
Bentler, 1994) was used to index the goodness of fit for each model.  The test is sensitive to large 
sample sizes (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) and a cut-off of a 2: df of <3 indicates an acceptable fit. 
Goodness of fit indices as recommended by Bentler (2007) were used:  the Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI); Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI); and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
with its 90% confidence interval (Moschopoulos & Canada, 1984). Better fitting models are denoted 
by higher CFI and TLI, with 0.90 representing a good fit, and 0.95 an excellent fit (Kline, 2005).  Better 
fitting models are indicated by lower RMSEA scores. RMSEA values of <0.05, and 90% confidence 
intervals whose lower bound contains, or is very close to, zero, and whose upper bound is <0.08, are 
thought to indicate a close fit, 0.05-0.08 a fair fit, and 0.08-0.10 a marginal fit by one standard 
deviation (Browne & Cudeck, 1992). Multiple fit indices assessed model fit as fit indices are heavily 
influenced by sample size, model parameters, and data-normality (Bentler, 2007). A good model 
would meet at least two fit criteria, and meeting three fit criteria would only be considered necessary 
according to a stringent criterion (Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Müller, 2003). Schwarz’s 
Bayesian information criterion model (BIC) combines goodness of fit with the number of model 
parameters needed to allow for model comparisons. BIC scores that are >10 points lower than the 
next lowest model are evidence for the superiority of one model (Raftery, 1995). Factor loadings of 
>.30 are needed for an item to be considered of practical significance (Hair et al., 2006). 
MIMIC modelling was used to explore the moderating effects of recruitment site (Brown, 
2006). A series of dummy variables was created, which were then specified in the structural equation 
for each of the items. To determine whether interpersonal (i.e., assault; n=87 cases) and non-
interpersonal (i.e., RTC and accidental injuries; n=507) experiences led to a distinct profile of PTSD 
symptoms (cf. Shevlin & Elklit, 2011), a multiple-sample group analysis (Bentler, 2006) was carried 
out in which tetrachoric correlation matrices were specified. In each analysis, factors that held 
univariate correlations to any ASD items were also co-varied; in this case age and sub-ASD (whether 
individuals met all of the DSM-IV ASD criteria except dissociation–a useful index of clinical status 
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given the problems with the dissociation criterion1) were removed by specifying them in the structural 
equation for each item. 
Results 
The latent structure of ASD in children and young people 
Table 3 presents the fit indices for the four models for the full sample. The 2 statistics for each 
model were significant, and all but the 1-factor DSM-5 model met the pre-requisite of a 2: df of ≤3. 
The 1-factor DSM-5 model was a good fit to the data (≥.90) according to the CFI but not according to 
the TLI.  The 3-, 4- (DSM-IV) and 5-factor models were all an excellent fit to the data according to 
both fit indices (CFI and TLI ≥.95). According to RMSEA scores, the 1-factor DSM-5 model was a fair 
fit (i.e., RMSEA ≤.08) whereas the 3- 4- and 5-factor models were all a close fit of the data (RMSEA 
≤.05). The lower bound confidence intervals within the RMSEA were also close to 0 for the three more 
complex models, indicating a higher level of precision. The model BIC highlighted the 3-factor 
structure as the preferred model, in that this model was 17 points lower than the next lowest model. 
Inter-factor correlations for the three factor model ranged between r=.50 (p<.001) and .80 (p<.001). 
We sought to determine the generalizability of this best-supported 3-factor model across: (a) 
recruitment site; and, (b) trauma type. Similar results were obtained when site differences were taken 
into account. The three factor model had the lowest BIC (by over 100) and an acceptable fit according 
to both CFI (≥ .90) and RMSEA (≤.08) although not by TLI (=.85<.90) or 2: df (=3.3>3). The multi-
sample CFA assessing differences in model fit across trauma type also showed the three factor 
model had the lowest BIC (by over 100), a 2: df of ≤3 and good fits using CFI (≥.90), RMSEA (≤.05) 
and TLI (≥.90).  
The factor loadings for the 3-factor model in the full sample are presented in Table 4. The pre-
requisite of a factor loading of >.30 was met for all items aside from amnesia for the trauma (DSM-5 
B7), which poorly loaded onto all other factors2.  
Prevalence rates 
                                                          
1 Prevalence of Sub-ASD varied between 10% and 49% across groups10 
2 This pattern of results for factor loadings was also replicated in group invariance tests addressing 
recruitment site and trauma type. 
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 DSM-5 ASD (9+ symptoms) led to a .3% increase in prevalence of ASD relative to DSM-IV, 
with rates of 13.6% and 13.3% found for the two models respectively. 
Relationship to impairment 
Two hundred and nine (35.2%) young people met the impairment criterion (i.e., whether the 
young person endorsed problems in at least one Criterion F area of functioning). Table 5 presents 
sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value (PPV), negative predictive value (NPV), for the 
percentage of young people correctly classified as suffering impairment using for the DSM-IV and 
DSM-5 models. Please see Supplementary Table S2 for a similar table documenting the results of 
alternate factor models. 
 The uni-factorial DSM-5 ASD model of 9+ symptoms and DSM-IV were remarkably similar, 
with DSM-5 only marginally outperforming the DSM-IV model in terms of sensitivity and numbers of 
cases correctly identified, although neither was strong. Reducing the DSM-5 symptom requirements 
to either 3+ or 4+ (cf. Kassam-Adams et al., 2012) symptoms improved the sensitivity of both models 
by >46 percentage points. However, this improvement was off-set by low specificity and elevated ASD 
prevalence rates.  
Discussion 
In the present study, we aimed to evaluate the latent structure of ASD symptoms in children and 
young people following single incident traumatic events and compare DSM-5 and DSM-IV prevalence 
rates and their ability to categorise children impaired by their symptoms. Our findings provided mixed 
support for the new diagnosis in children and young people. Our exploratory examination of the 3-
factor model showed that it offered the optimal account of symptom clustering. The findings showed 
that the DSM-5 ‘general distress’ model was a good fit for the data according to two of three fit 
indices, whereas the 3- and 4- and 5-factor models were excellent fits for the data according to all 
three fit indices. DSM-5 and DSM-IV models led to very similar prevalence rates and were both poor 
models for categorising children’s level of impairment. The sensitivity of the uni-factorial model was 
improved by lowering the symptom threshold from 9+ (DSM-5) to 3+/4+ symptoms (cf. Kassam-
Adams et al.,2012). 
Overall, the preferred model from a structural perspective was the 3-factor model, with re-
experiencing and arousal symptoms clustered together, but distinct from avoidance and dissociation. 
It is important to note that this consistent factor structure was upheld after adjusting for, age, sub-ASD 
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and site differences and comparisons across trauma type. The 3-factor model was previously shown 
to meet the requisite requirements of a good fitting model in three studies of ASD in adults 
(Edmondson et al., 2010; Hansen et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2010), but this model was not evaluated in 
the only adolescent study on this issue (Mordeno & Cue, 2015). The findings challenge the cluster-
free approach of ASD in the DSM-5, as clustering is clearly present acutely following traumatic 
experiences. The good fit of adult post-traumatic stress models on the whole suggests that early 
responses to trauma are perhaps not dissimilar from chronic responses in children. Theoretically, this 
raises important further questions. If the symptom structure of ASD is similar to PTSD, we might 
surmise that there is no evidence for an early “general distress” syndrome, but rather a distinctive 
early post-traumatic stress response that proceeds (without fundamental change in symptom 
structure) to PTSD in some cases, but remits naturally over time without intervention in others 
(Kassam-Adams et al. 2004; Meiser-Stedman et al., 2005, 2008). However, this is speculative as a 
two-factor PTSD model (i.e., avoidance, re-experiencing+arousal) has rarely been examined in the 
child literature. Future CFA studies carried out in youth should test this model to determine the 
continuities/discontinuities in the structure of acute and chronic trauma responses in youth. In 
particular, future research must consider whether dissociation symptoms are an essential feature of 
the ASD diagnosis, whether there is any benefit if a more liberal number of symptoms are endorsed in 
competing models with a stronger factor structure, or whether a dissociative subtype of ASD should 
be introduced. 
Examination of patterns of prevalence and discriminant validity were informative. Our results 
indicate that the adoption of the DSM-5 model does not have a negative impact on the detection of 
children impaired by their symptoms relative to the other competing models (with superior patterns of 
clustering). Prevalence rates for both models were within the ranges suggested by previous research 
of ASD in youth (Bryant et al., 2004; Dalgleish et al., 2008; Kassam-Adams & Winston, 2004; Meiser-
Stedman et al., 2008). Replicating previous research (Kassam-Adams et al., 2012), the DSM-5 cluster 
free model was more closely associated with clinical impairment  when the developmental changes 
suggested by Kassam-Adams et al. (2012) of 3+ or 4+ symptom cut-offs were suggested, although 
making such a change to the DSM would need to be carefully considered as our data indicate these 
lower cut-offs would likely lead to a higher rates of false positives as well as markedly increasing 
prevalence rates. This might then increase the provision of treatment to children whose symptoms are 
13 
 
in fact likely to abate over time naturally, directing valuable resources away from children potentially in 
greater need of help (Magruder & Calderone, 2000; Mullins-Sweatt, Lengel, & DeShong, 2016). To 
explore this position further, prospective studies investigating the impact of factor structure on 
recovery trajectories and relapse rates in youth must be carried out. 
Some aspects of the present methodology merit comment. The data here were collected prior to 
the publication of the DSM-5 and we therefore have no pure measure of the new B5 emotional 
numbing symptom that refers to an absence of positive affect only (instead we used an item asking 
people to indicate their recent experience of positive or negative affect). In saying that, the addition of 
this new symptom would not have influenced the results of the CFA analyses that suggest that 
cluster-free approaches are the weakest of each of the models. We also pooled data across four sites 
that use different instruments on the basis that DSM diagnoses are universal and different diagnostic 
instruments are designed to yield the same underlying constructs. However, the low numbers in some 
groups (e.g., Oxford, interpersonal-trauma) was a limitation. Furthermore, the fit of the 3-factor model 
was reduced when controlling for site, although it is important to highlight that it still met the minimum 
fit requirement of a ‘good’ model (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). Prevalence rates of ASD varied 
widely across site. Prevalence rates of ASD varied widely across site. These differences are likely 
due to a number of reasons, including differing age distributions, different countries within which the 
studies were conducted, different distributions of trauma types recruited, and different research 
teams. Power limitations preclude a satisfactory examination of these factors via sub-analyses. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to show that the ‘uni-factorial’ DSM-5 model is not the 
optimal account of ASD symptom structure in youth. With the publication of DSM-5 in 2013, and its 
cluster-free approach to ASD, there is a significant need to continue to more fully explore the impact 
of nosological models of ASD in youth on theory and clinical practice. 
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Key Points   
 The latent structure of Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) symptoms has never before been 
investigated in a sample of youth following ED attendance or hospital admission. 
 The results of this Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) investigation showed that a “cluster free” 
model of ASD, the model adopted for the DSM-5 (i.e. a “general distress” conceptualisation of 
early responses to trauma), was not supported in youth; instead a 3-factor model comprising 
dissociation, re-experiencing/arousal and avoidance dimensions was found to be the preferred 
model. 
 This study shows that the pattern of symptom clustering directly opposes the ‘general-distress’ 
model of ASD in DSM-5 and supports a continuity between the structure of acute stress reactions 
and chronic post-traumatic stress (as specified in the PTSD diagnosis). 
 The proportion of children that will develop DSM-5 ASD following exposure to single incident 
trauma is approximately 13.6 percent.  
 Reducing the DSM-5 ASD algorithm to either 3 or 4 symptoms improved the sensitivity of DSM-5 
ASD to detect children impaired by their symptoms.  
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Table 1. Model specifications for alternative factor models of ASD. 
DSM-5 ASD symptoms Model 1 
DSM-5 
1-factor 
Model 2 
Alternate 
3-factor 
Model 3 
DSM-IV 
4-factor1 
Model 4 
Alternate 
5-factor 
B1. Intrusive memories, thoughts ASD Re-ex/Ar Re-ex Re-ex 
B2. Nightmares ASD Re-ex/Ar Re-ex Re-ex 
B3. Flashbacks ASD Re-ex/Ar Re-ex Re-ex 
B4a. Psychological distress to reminders1 ASD Re-ex/Ar Re-ex Re-ex 
B4b. Physiological reactivity 1 ASD Re-ex/Ar Re-ex Re-ex 
B5. Emotional numbing2 ASD Diss Diss Diss 
B6a. Altered sense of reality: loss of 
awareness3 
ASD Diss Diss Diss 
B6b. Altered sense of reality: Derealisation3 ASD Diss Diss Diss 
B6c. Altered sense of reality: 
Depersonalisation3 
ASD Diss Diss Diss 
B7. Amnesia ASD Diss Diss Diss 
B8. Avoid thinking/conversations ASD Av Av Av 
B9. Avoid places/things/people ASD Av Av Av 
B10. Difficulty sleeping ASD Re-ex/Ar Ar Dys-Ar 
B11. Irritability ASD Re-ex/Ar Ar Dys-Ar 
B12 Difficulty concentrating ASD Re-ex/Ar Ar Dys-Ar 
B13. Hyper-vigilance ASD Re-ex/Ar Ar Anx-Ar 
B14. Startle ASD Re-ex/Ar Ar Anx-ar 
 
1 DSM-IV symptoms (C: psychological distress to reminders; E: Physiological reactivity) are grouped 
under the one symptom in DSM-5 (DSM-5 B4). 
2 DSM-IV emotional numbing (B1) is reworded in DSM-5 to describe absence of positive emotional 
experiences (DSM-5 B5). 
3 DSM-IV reduction in awareness of surroundings (B2), derealization (B3), and depersonalization (B4) 
are grouped under DSM-5 Altered Sense of Reality (B)6. 
Note. Diss=dissociation; Av=avoidance; Ar=arousal; Re-ex=re-experiencing; Dys-Ar=dysphoric 
arousal; Anx-ar=anxious arousal; ASD=Acute Stress Disorder. 
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Table 2. Demographic characteristics and trauma related characteristics for the 4 sites. 
 
 Descriptives  
 East Anglia London Oxford Philadelphia Total 
Demographics      
n 32% (n=189) 25% (n=151) 11% (n=65) 32% (n=189) 100% (n=594) 
Age (M, SD) 14.17 (2.89)  11.94 (3.00) 12.67 (2.68) 11.39 (2.41) 12.56 (2.99) 
6-8 yrs 5.8% (n=11) 19% (n=28) 11% (n=7) 14% (n=27) 12% (n=73) 
9-12 yrs 30% (n=56) 41% (n=62) 42% (n=27) 55% (n=103) 42% (n=248) 
13-16 yrs 65% (n=122) 40% (n=61) 48% (n=31) 31% (n=59) 46% (n=273) 
Male gender   56% (n=107) 58% (n=88) 58% (n=38) 76% (n=144) 64% (n=377) 
 
Trauma type 
Assault 
RTC 
Accidental injury  
 
 
19% (n=35)  
47% (n= 88)  
35% (n=66)  
 
 
34% (n=52) 
66% (n=99) 
0% (n=0) 
 
 
0% (n=0) 
100% (n=65) 
0% (n=0) 
 
 
0% (n=0) 
100% (n=189) 
0% (n=0) 
 
 
15% (n=87) 
74% (n=441) 
11% (n=66) 
 
Full DSM-5 ASD met 
 
13%(n=25) 
 
23% (n=35) 
 
28% (n=12) 
 
5% (n=9) 
 
14% (n=103) 
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Table 3. Fit Indices for the four alternative ASD models (N=594) in the pooled sample. 
Item 
Models 
Satorra-Bentler 
2(df)1 
p BIC2 CFI3 90% CI 
RMSEA4 
TLI5 
1 Factor 2(118)=391.78 <.001 -361.87 0.90 0.063; 0.056, 
0.069 
0.89 
3 Factors6 2(116)=234.09 <.001 -506.79 0.96 0.041; 0.034, 
0.049 
0.95 
4 Factors 2(113)=231.10 <.001 -490.61 0.96 0.042; 0.034, 
0.050 
0.95 
5 Factors 2(109)=207.14 <.001 -489.03 0.97 0.039; 0.031, 
0.047 
0.96 
Note 
1 Satorra Bentler 2; 2 Bayesian Information Criterion; 3 Comparative Fit Index; 4 Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation; 5 Tucker Lewis Index; 6 Models in bold indicate the best fitting model. 
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 Table 4. Standardized factor loadings (standard errors) for the ASD 3-factor model in the pooled 
sample (N=594). 
DsM-5 ASD symptoms Dissociation Re-experiencing/ 
Arousal  
Avoidance 
B1. Intrusive memories, thoughts 
 0.83 (0.04)  
B2. Nightmares 
 0.69 (0.05)  
B3. Flashbacks 
 0.82 (0.06)  
B4a. Distress to reminders1 
 0.71 (0.05)  
B4b. Physiological reactivity1 
 0.75 (0.05)  
B5. Emotional numbing2 
0.72 (0.05)   
B6a. loss of awareness3 
0.70 (0.05)   
B6b. Derealisation3 
0.87 (0.06)   
B6c. Depersonalisation3 
0.75 (0.05)   
B7. Amnesia 
0.16 (0.06)   
B8. Avoid thinking/conversations 
  0.83 (0.05) 
B9. Avoid places/things/people 
  0.85 (0.05) 
B10. Difficulty sleeping 
 0.70 (0.05)  
B11. Irritability 
 0.63 (0.05)  
B12 Difficulty concentrating 
 0.73 (0.05)  
B13. Hyper-vigilance 
 0.75 (0.05)  
B14. Startle 
 0.77 (0.04)  
1 DSM-IV symptoms (C: psychological distress to reminders; E: Physiological reactivity) are grouped 
under DSM-5 B4. 
2 DSM-IV emotional numbing (B1) is reworded in DSM-5 to describe absence of positive emotional 
experiences (DSM-5 B5). 
3 DSM-IV reduction in awareness of surroundings (B2), derealization (B3), and depersonalization (B4) 
are grouped under DSM-5 B6. 
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Table 5. Performance of different symptom requirements per acute stress models to predict concurrent ratings of impairment (N=594). 
Model  Cluster Frequency 
symptom/diagnosis1 
Sensitivi
ty 
Specificit
y 
PPV NPV % correctly 
classified 
% ASD 
diagnosis 
Model 1: DSM-5 One-factor: [3+]2 194 (32.7%) 92.82 49.35 49.8
7 
92.68 64.6 33.0% 
Model 1: DSM-5 One-factor: [4+]3 178 (30.0%) 85.17 63.64 55.9
7 
88.77 71.2 30.0% 
Model 1: DSM-5 One-factor: [9+]4 103 (17.3%) 38.77 94.29 78.6
4 
73.93 74.7 13.6% 
Model 3: DSM-IV Four factor DSM-IV5 103 (17.3%) 37.80 93.77 76.7
0 
73.52 74.1 13.3% 
Note. NPV=negative predictive value; PPV=positive predictive value  
1 The number of cases meeting the frequency requirement per symptom cluster and diagnosis (i.e., without meeting impairment). 
23+ symptoms from the DSM-5 list of 14 symptoms 
3 4+ symptoms from the DSM-5 list of 14 symptoms 
4 9+ symptoms from the DSM-5 list of 14 symptoms 
5  
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Supplementary Table 1. Confirmatory Factor Analytic studies examining the structure of Acute Stress 
Disorder symptoms in adults.  
Study  Sample  Models tested1  CFI2  RMSEA3 
Brooks et al. 
(2008)  
N=587 level 1 
trauma 
patients 
Dissociation, re-experiencing, arousal, 
avoidance 
Dissociation1st order,  re-experiencing 1st order,  
arousal1st order,  avoidance1st order, general 
distress2nd order 
.97* 
 
.97* 
.036* 
 
.032* 
Edmondson et 
al. (2010)  
N=132 
Hurricane 
Katrina 
evacuees. 
Dissociation, re-experiencing, arousal, 
avoidance 
Dissociation, re-experiencing/arousal, 
avoidance 
Dissociation1s order,  re-experiencing 1st order,  
arousal1st order,  avoidance1st order, general 
distress2nd order 
Dissociation1st order , re-experiencing 2nd 
order, avoidance2nd order, arousal2nd order 
.86 
 
.91* 
 
.92* 
 
.93* 
.09 
 
.07* 
 
.07* 
 
.07* 
Wang et al. 
(2010)  
N=353 
Chinese 
earthquake 
victims 
Dissociation, re-experiencing, arousal, 
avoidance 
Dissociation, re-experiencing/arousal, 
avoidance  
Dissociation, dissociative amnesia, acute 
posttraumatic stress reactions 
Dissociation1st order,  re-experiencing 1st order,  
arousal1st order,  avoidance 1st order  general 
distress2nd order 
.99* 
 
.99* 
.99* 
 
.99* 
 
.038* 
 
.039* 
.042* 
 
.039* 
Hansen et al. 
(2012)  
N=404 rape 
and bank 
robbery with 
ASD. 
ASD 
Dissociation, re-experiencing /arousal, 
avoidance 
Dissociation, re-experiencing, arousal, 
avoidance 
Dissociation, re-experiencing, 
dysphoria, arousal, avoidance 
.59 
.74 
 
.74 
 
.81 
.085 
.069* 
 
.069* 
 
.061* 
Armour et al. 
(2013)  
N=380 Danish 
rape victims 
ASD 
Dissociation, re-experiencing/arousal, 
avoidance 
Dissociation, re-experiencing, arousal, 
avoidance 
.67 
.80 
 
.80 
.81 
.075* 
.058* 
 
058* 
.058* 
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Study  Sample  Models tested1  CFI2  RMSEA3 
Dissociation, re-experiencing, dysphoria, 
arousal, avoidance 
Dissociation, re-experiencing, numbing, 
avoidance, arousal 
 
.79 
 
.06* 
Hansen et al. 
(2013)  
N=450 bank 
robbery 
victims. 
ASD 
Dissociation1st order, re-experiencing 2nd order, 
avoidance2nd order, arousal2nd order 
Dissociation, re-experiencing /arousal, 
avoidance 
Dissociation, re-experiencing, arousal, 
avoidance 
.96* 
.97* 
.98* 
 
.98* 
.089 
.076* 
.070* 
 
.068* 
 
Note  
1 Models italicised either had a good or excellent fit of the data according to the 2 in addition to CFI 
and RMSEA fit indices. Models in bold are the best fitting model. 
2Comparative Fit Index: The ratio of the difference between the 2 for the fitted model and the null 
model divided by the 2 for the null model with ≥ .90=good fit and ≥ .95=excellent fit. CFI’s meeting 
either criteria are marked by an asterisk. 
3 Root Mean Square Error of approximation: The amount of unexplained variance left by the models 
with ≤.05 suggesting a close fit and ≤.08 suggesting a fair fit. CFI’s meeting either criteria are marked 
by an asterisk.
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